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We analyzed the economic consequences of a husband’s death using events that occurred 
between the first two waves of the HRS and AHEAD studies.  We compared poverty 
transitions against published results from Social Security’s Retirement History Survey of 
the 1970s.  Widowhood remains an important risk factor for transition into poverty, 
although somewhat less so than twenty years ago.  Women over age 65 (AHEAD) are 
less likely to experience severe economic changes than women under age 61 (HRS).  
Several factors account for the age differences: the declining importance of husband’s 
earnings with age, the rising importance of Social Security benefits, and the occasionally 
large out-of-pocket medical expenses associated with husband’s death before Medicare 
eligibility.  The greater economic impact of widowhood at younger ages is consistent 
with our cross-section evidence that poverty rates rise with duration of widowhood but 
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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
  High rates of poverty among widows, especially those living alone, remain a 
primary concern of policies for the elderly (Burkhauser, 1994; Sandell and Iams, 1997).  
It is important to establish how a relatively low rate of poverty among married couples 
just before or after retirement yields such high rates for widows.  The evolution of the 
economic status of widows can be decomposed into three major components:  1) 
potential resources for widowhood inherent in the financial situation of intact married 
couples, 2) effects associated with the event of husband’s death, and 3) declining status 
associated with duration of widowhood.  A similar classification was used by Zick and 
Smith (1991) in an analysis of transitions into widowhood using the Panel Survey of 
Income Dynamics (PSID).   
  This paper addresses the question of the origins of widow poverty by making use 
of both the cross-sectional and the longitudinal aspects of the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS), part of which was formerly the study of Asset and Health Dynamics 
Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD).  The HRS began in 1992 with a sample of 12,652 
persons either aged 51-61 themselves or married to someone who was, of whom 5,181 
were age-eligible women.  The AHEAD began in 1993 with a sample of 8,222 persons 
aged 70 or older, or married to someone who was, of whom 4,540 were age-eligible 
women. In 1998, the two original studies were combined and two new cohorts were 
added to produce a cross-section sample that is representative of the US population born 
in years up to 1947 (51 and over in 1998).  Out of a total sample of 21,351 in 1998, 
11,323 were age-eligible women. For longitudinal analyses, we use 1998 plus the first 
  2two waves (1992 and 1994) of the original HRS (persons born 1931-41), and the first two 
waves (1993 and 1995) of the AHEAD (persons born before 1924). 
  The HRS and AHEAD surveys elicit detailed information on assets, pensions, 
housing, insurance, and Social Security eligibility in addition to information about 
income.  Other studies of widowhood have had to focus more narrowly on current 
income, neglecting the full potential to support lifetime consumption and often producing 
the appearance of volatile movements into and out of poverty (Bound, 1991; McGarry, 
1995).  The HRS can be used to replicate conventional income-based definitions of 
poverty but we are also able to study the long-term implications for consumption of 
changes in wealth associated with changes in marital status (Weir and Willis, 2000).   
  The HRS for 1998 represents a complete cross-section of the US population over 
50, and is nearly as large a sample for that age group as the March CPS.  The HRS is thus 
a plausible substitute or comparator for CPS-based analyses of income of the elderly 
(e.g., the biennial publication of the Social Security Administration’s Office of Research, 




Poverty by Marital Status 
Table 1 compares CPS poverty rates for women with estimates from HRS and 
AHEAD for the same years of observation.  Overall, estimates from the HRS 1998 cross-
section are slightly lower than CPS figures (11.4 vs 12.2% for all women).  This is most 
likely due to slight improvements in the HRS survey design over the CPS, most notably 
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composition by marital status, race, or age, because the HRS analytic weights are post-
stratified to match the CPS.  One difference between the studies not corrected by 
weighting is that HRS treats unmarried couples who report they live together “as if 
married” as if they were a single financial unit, combining the incomes of both partners.  
CPS does not indicate whether two unrelated people have a shared financial relationship. 
That is also not likely to be the most important factor, however, because the gap between 
the studies for married women is greater than for the total (and therefore greater than for 
the non-married).   
Both data sources show the enormous differential in poverty rates between 
married women and those who are not.   In recent years, the economic status of widows 
has improved relative to other non-married women, as shown in their lower poverty rates 
compared with divorced or never-married women in most of our comparison periods. 
  Table 1 also shows the familiar pattern of poverty rates increasing with age.   This 
can be seen by comparing early waves of HRS with AHEAD, and in the age categories 
for 1998.  Looking within marital status categories, however, there is not a consistent age 
pattern.  Most of the overall trend with age is due to the fact that the percentage of 
women with living husbands declines as they age. 
 
Income Security 
The HRS can look at income security from several perspectives, as in Figure 1.  
Many women would be in poverty if they had only their own earned or private pension 
and asset income to depend on.  In Figure 1, we show the percent of women by age who 
  4would fall into poverty if deprived of marriage, income of other family members, or 
Social Security.  The percentages are calculated by deducting the indicated source of 
income and recalculating the poverty rate  (as in Grad, 1996).   For women under 62, 
Social Security is of rather small importance, because very few women meet the special 
eligibility requirements for payments before 62.  In contrast, over 11% would be in 
poverty without their spouse’s income (at the higher per-capita income threshold for 
poverty for singles compared with married).  Between ages 62 and 65 Social Security 
surpasses marriage slightly.  Because most husbands retire by the time the wife is 65, 
marriage declines in importance with age, while Social Security rises.  By age 85, 43% of 
women are kept out of poverty by Social Security.  Other (non-spouse) family income is 
of trivial importance prior to 65, but becomes increasingly important thereafter, rising to 
a 5 percentage point reduction in women’s poverty by age 85.   
  In Figure 2 we look at the impact of Social Security by marital status. Under age 
75, it is primarily widows who are lifted out of poverty by Social Security.  Although the 
impact on widows continues to rise with age, the impact of Social Security on married 
women and divorced women rises even more rapidly to the oldest-old, where over 40% 
of all marital status groups are kept from poverty by Social Security. 
 
Duration of Widowhood 
  Standard CPS publications on poverty do not report rates by marital status, only 
by living arrangement.  The Social Security Administration’s biennial reports using CPS 
do calculate income by marital status (see e.g., Grad, 1996), but are not able to study 
effects by duration in marital status because that is not available in CPS.  The HRS 
  5obtains retrospective marital history information from all respondents at baseline.  From 
this, we can calculate for all widows present in 1998 the date at which they most recently 
became widowed, and thus the length of time they have been widowed.   
Figure 3 shows how poverty rates vary by age and by duration of widowhood.   
With respect to age, there is a U-shaped pattern, with poverty rates higher for women 
under 65, substantially lower from 65 to about 80, and then rising among the oldest-old.  
Duration effects are more of a J-shaped pattern: high at very short durations, lower for the 
next ten years, and then rising rapidly at longer durations.  The short durations are 
problematical (see also Burkhauser, et al., 1986).  By the nature of the HRS interview, no 
income earned by the deceased husband will be reported, even if he was alive for part of 
the preceding calendar year.  Some of these women may not yet have received the 
increments to Social Security or pension survivor benefits that will eventually raise their 
incomes. 
  If we exclude short durations, the statistical association between poverty and 
duration of widowhood is clear.  In an analysis of variance, the duration categories 
explain about twice as much of the variance as do the age categories.  Regression analysis 
can be used to generate synthetic profiles of the risk of poverty as a function of age and 
duration.  These profiles are shown in Figure 4.   Bearing in mind that these are synthetic 
profiles estimated from a single cross-section, and not true longitudinal observations, the 
simulated profiles suggest that over 15% of women widowed at 55, prior to eligibility for 
Social Security retirement income, will be in poverty once widowed. There is some initial 
decline in poverty up to about age 65, probably because of the take-up of Social Security 
benefits, and then a systematic increase in poverty as they age.  Women widowed at 65 or 
  675 have lower initial poverty rates, but their economic position deteriorates steadily.  At 
any given age, the women who had been widowed longest (youngest) had higher poverty 
rates. 
  The strong statistical association between poverty and duration of widowhood 
could reflect any number of causal influences.  Current age is of course exactly equal to 
age at widowhood plus duration of widowhood, and no statistical method can correctly 
identify separate effects of all three.  Because in our model we hold current age constant 
in the analyses, duration of widowhood is equivalent to  (minus) age at widowhood.  
Moreover, because we are working with a single cross-section, duration of widowhood is 
also equivalent to (minus) date of widowhood.  Age at widowhood is likely to be 
important because of the life-cycle pattern of saving and dissaving for retirement.  Losing 
a husband before retirement incurs a loss of potential future private saving, pension 
accrual, and Social Security benefit increases.   Consumption must be supported for 
several years before pension or Social Security benefits begin.   Death is often associated 
with high medical expenses, more of which may be out-of-pocket expenses when death 
occurs before Medicare eligibility at age 65.  For these cohorts, date of widowhood may 
also matter.  Women who lost their husbands more than twenty years before the baseline 
interviews were widowed before the ERISA reforms of 1974 improved the rights of 
women in their husband’s private pensions. 
  Duration of widowhood also proxies for the effects of several selection 
mechanisms that operate over time.  We would expect that mortality rates are higher for 
poor women, leaving a smaller proportion of poor women as duration increases–just the 
opposite of what we observe.  That does not mean that mortality selection does not 
  7operate, only that it is dominated by something else.  If better-off widows are more likely 
to remarry, then we would expect to find increasing poverty with duration of widowhood.  
It is unlikely, however, that remarriage selection could dominate the mortality selection 
because remarriage is too rare.  Among HRS widows at wave 1, 17 died and 6 remarried 
by wave 2.  Among AHEAD widows, 286 died and 8 remarried. 
  Duration of widowhood could also have a direct effect on income.  Social 
Security, which is adjusted for inflation at the same rate as the poverty thresholds, should 
not be much affected by duration of widowhood.  Private pensions are not always 
indexed and survivor benefits may not always be for the life of the widow, so it is 
possible that income from private pensions decreases with duration of widowhood.  
Finally, if private savings are consumed at too high a rate early in widowhood there will 
be less asset income available at later durations. 
Crude descriptive evidence, then, indicates that current age and duration of 
widowhood are separately and independently related to widow poverty rates.  Because 
current age minus duration of widowhood equals the age at which widowhood began, we 
cannot infer from cross-sectional data whether this pattern arises from true duration 
effects, such as over-consumption out of assets, or from effects due to age at widowhood, 
such as greater shocks to lifetime income or stronger income-related selection effects at 
younger ages.  The fact that the age profile of recent widows shows higher poverty rates 
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  Social Security benefits do not decline over time for an individual. We can use the 
benefits reported in HRS to demonstrate that age at widowhood is at least partly 
independently responsible for the duration patterns shown above. Figure 5 shows how the 
average annual benefit received by widows (over age 62) varies by duration of 
widowhood, holding age constant.  Social Security benefits decline with duration (except 
at the shortest durations, where some women have probably not had their benefits 
adjusted yet).  The drop is about 1600 dollars from durations 2-7 to 20+.   That implies, 
for example, that on average a 75-year-old woman widowed at age 70 would receive 
$133 per month more than a 75-year-old woman widowed at age 50. Because we know 
that Social Security benefits for an individual do not decline over time, this pattern 
suggests that women who were widowed at younger ages had lower couple lifetime 
earnings, either because of lower incomes or shorter working lives.   
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits are means-tested to provide an 
income slightly below the poverty line and are therefore a sensitive indicator of poverty.  
Figure 6 shows that benefits from SSI increase with duration of widowhood, as one 
would expect if poverty rates increase with duration.  Note, too, that SSI benefits are 
higher at very short durations, indicating that the higher poverty rates observed there may 
not be entirely an artifact. 
 
LONGITUDINAL ANALYSES 
  Using HRS cross-sectional data for 1998, we found that poverty rates tended to be 
higher for widows who had been widowed for a longer time, holding age constant.  The 
  9pattern appears to be consistent with two underlying processes: a higher initial rate of 
poverty among women widowed earlier in life, and a general tendency for poverty rates 
to rise with length of widowhood.  Cross-sectional data have limitations, however.  We 
cannot entirely rule out the possibility of cohort or period effects generating the patterns 
we see.  Moreover, even if we were certain that age at widowhood and duration of 
widowhood were both related to poverty rates by age, that does not tell us what economic 
or demographic forces produce such a pattern.  Longitudinal data can examine directly 
whether and why early widowhood is associated with higher poverty, and what happens 
to widows over time. 
  Longitudinal analysis using HRS is limited to the two cohorts who entered the 
study prior to 1998: the original HRS birth cohort of 1931-41 introduced in 1992, and the 
AHEAD birth cohorts born 1923 and earlier who were introduced in 1993.  Women who 
were in the age-eligible cohorts in 1992 (51-61) were younger and predominantly “pre-
retirement,” in contrast to the AHEAD women (70+ in 1993) who were mostly past 
retirement.  That means, for example, that most of the HRS women did not receive Social 
Security benefits in 1992, but a substantial number became eligible between 1992 and 
1998, while most of the AHEAD women were eligible and receiving Social Security. 
 
Historical Comparison of Poverty Transition Rates 
One advantage of longitudinal data is the ability to study the effect of economic 
status in marriage on the probability of being poor when widowed.  Table 2 shows 
transition rates into poverty for the Retirement History Survey of the 1970s, and two 
transition periods each for HRS and AHEAD.  Note first the central columns for “new 
  10widows” which compares the poverty status of women widowed by the end of a 
transition period with their poverty status in marriage prior to widowhood.  The 1970s 
were a harder time for widows generally: in the RHS 37% of women widowed from non-
poor marriages were in poverty afterward, while 85% who began in poor marriages 
remained poor.  Compare that to the AHEAD cohort, which shows relatively stable 
patterns of 10-12% of non-poor married women becoming poor after widowhood, and 
42% of poor married women leaving poverty after widowhood.  The HRS evidence is 
more mixed, suggesting perhaps that poverty rates in 1994 were overestimated (income 
underestimated at the low end of the distribution).  If that were true, then the 1992-94 
transition rates into poverty are too high and the 1994-98 transition rates too low.  What’s 
clear is that the rate of transition from non-poor to poor for new widows was higher, 
perhaps twice as high in HRS as in AHEAD, while still being lower than in the RHS 
study.  Thus, despite substantial progress, the risks of entering poverty after a husband’s 
death are considerably greater for women widowed before retirement  than for those 
widowed later. 
 
SES, Mortality, and Selectivity of Widowhood 
  The first comparison we make is of the force of the well-known correlation of 
mortality and socio-economic status.  Using married couples at baseline (1992 or 1993), 
we estimated separate logistic regressions of the probability of a husband’s death between 
baseline and 1998 as a function of husband’s age and family income as a percentage of 
poverty. Figure 7 shows how the relative risk of a husband’s death varies as a function of 
household income relative to the poverty line.  The relative risks were computed 
  11separately for each cohort, thus neutralizing the much higher average death rate in the 
older cohorts.   The younger HRS cohort shows a somewhat steeper and more regular 
path of declining mortality with higher income.  Couples at under 150% of the poverty 
line were 2.3 times more likely to experience a husband’s death than the comparison 
group of 300-600% of poverty.  The AHEAD cohort shows similar but smaller 
differences by SES: the group at under 150% of poverty was 1.8 times more likely to 
experience a husband’s death.  The highest income group in the HRS experienced only 
60% of the deaths that the reference group did, while in AHEAD there was essentially no 
difference between the top group and the reference group.   
  Because the income distributions differ between HRS and AHEAD, we re-
estimated the logistic regressions using percentile ranking in the cohort-specific income 
distribution instead of income relative to poverty.  Figure 8 shows much the same pattern 
as Figure 7: a steeper and steadier SES gradient in HRS, and a more shallow one for 
AHEAD.  Beyond the median income, there is no clear benefit to higher income for 
married men over 70. 
  The stronger the SES-mortality gradient, the greater the selectivity of mortality.  
In the HRS, where couples near the poverty line have a greater relative risk of producing 
a widow than in the older cohorts, we expect new widows to be disproportionately 
represented by women from households with few resources.  That will still be true at 
older ages, but less so.  One factor relating age at widowhood to risk of poverty, then, is 
the stronger association of SES and mortality at younger ages. 
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  Although the selectivity of mortality contributes to a higher rate of poverty among 
women widowed at younger ages, there are also differences in the impact of resources 
lost at widowhood.  The economic status of widows is determined by assets, earned 
income, pension income, Social Security, and by the income of family members in the 
same household.   We look at the trends in each income source, by type of marital 
transition and by cohort.  In each case, we compare trends between baseline (1992 for 
HRS; 1993 for AHEAD and 1998).  Three groups are shown: women who were married 
throughout the interval (“married”), women who became widowed during the interval 
(“new widows”), and women who were widowed throughout the interval (“widows”). 
  Figures 9 and 10 show the course of median net worth (in 1998 dollars) for HRS 
and AHEAD women, respectively.  By comparing the baseline position of new widows 
with that of the other married couples, we see again the selectivity of husband’s 
mortality: new widows  had lower median net worth while married than did married 
couples who remained married in 1998.  Similarly, women who were widowed prior to 
baseline had even less net worth than the two married groups.  In both cohorts, 
continuing widows made essentially no gains during a boom market, while stably married 
couples showed further increases in wealth.  The main contrast between the two age 
groups is that while HRS new widows lost wealth to fall nearly to the level of continuing 
widows by 1998, the new widows in AHEAD posted gains in net worth.  One possible 
explanation of this pattern is that in the absence of Social Security income, consumption 
pressures on new younger widows led to a greater rate of consumption out of assets.  
  13Another is that a higher proportion of net worth pre-retirement is held in business assets 
whose value depends on the survival of the husband. 
  Figures 11 and 12 show the changes in household Social Security benefits for the 
same groups, also in 1998 dollars.  The AHEAD cohorts in Figure 12 reflect perfectly the 
rules of the Social Security system, in which benefits are based on lifetime earnings and 
adjust by formula after widowhood.  New AHEAD widows had nearly the same benefits 
as other married couples in 1993, indicating that they had similar lifetime incomes 
despite having less wealth.  Following a husband’s death, widow benefits will in general 
range from 67% of the married level, assuming the spousal benefit was equal to half that 
of the primary earner, down to 50% replacement in the case where both partners had 
equal benefits based on earnings.  Thus, new widows averaged around $10,000 per year 
in benefits compared to just over $15,000 while married.  Continuously married and 
continuously widowed households showed essentially no change. 
In the HRS cohort, the patterns are primarily determined by who claims benefits 
and who does not.  The median-aged members of the HRS cohort only reached age 62 in 
1998, so roughly half the cohort was not eligible to claim retirement benefits.  New 
widows were more likely to be receiving benefits while married in 1992, probably 
because their husbands were older or retired sooner due to poor health.  After 
widowhood, these new widows had higher average benefits because many of them 
became eligible to claim between 1992 and 1998.  Continuously married couples 
experienced the greatest growth in mean benefits received because they were less likely 
than the others to be receiving benefits in 1992 and because they were entitled to higher 
benefits when claimed. 
  14  Pension and annuity income, shown in Figures 13 and 14, behaves similarly to 
Social Security benefits, largely because of similar eligibility rules by age.  Thus, in HRS, 
continuing widows and continuously married couples both increased pension and annuity 
income as more became eligible.  New widows in both HRS and AHEAD lost pension 
and annuity income between baseline and 1998.  In both cases the gap between new 
widows and the married in 1998 was on the order of five thousand dollars per year.   It is 
somewhat surprising that pension income in HRS should decline, because many men had 
not yet claimed pension income.  It appears, however, that among married men at 
baseline, those who would eventually leave a widow were more likely to have taken early 
retirement, perhaps because of poor health, and in both cohorts pension benefits were 
reduced after death.  ERISA laws require both spouses’ signatures to claim pension 
benefits on a single life, but joint-and-survivor annuities providing only 50% survivor 
benefits are a common default plan that does not require the potential survivor’s 
signature.  Thus, while total loss of pension benefits after a husband’s death has become 
uncommon, full retention is also rare.  The growth in income for stable marriages and 
widows in AHEAD suggests that some of the income may be based on funds whose 
payout depends on equity values, which improved over this time period. 
 
Responses to Widowhood 
  The economic consequences we reviewed above are essentially passive: women 
cannot respond to the death of a husband by simply choosing to have more wealth or 
higher pension benefits immediately.  There are, however, a few response options 
available. One way in which widows at any age can compensate for reduced economic 
  15status is to co-reside with other family members.  Not much is known about exactly how 
such living arrangements allocate resources within the household.  The poverty scales 
assume that income is pooled, and treat coresident family members as a single economic 
unit.  
In Figures 15 and 16, we trace the changes in other-person income for the three 
marital transition groups.  Continuously married couples have very little other-person 
income.  In HRS, this average level declines over time due to the departure of young 
adult children from some households.  Baseline widows had much higher levels.   In both 
HRS and AHEAD, newly-widowed women increased their other-person income in by 
about $1500.  By 1998, they had substantially more than continuously married, but still 
less than continuously widowed women.  This could reflect either a slow adjustment 
process for new widows, or a worse economic situation for women widowed earlier.  In 
the AHEAD cohort, where the difference between new and continuing widows in 1998 
was very large, it almost certainly reflects lower personal resources of early widows who 
moved in with other family in the past. 
  A second response mechanism is earnings from work.  We examine this for the 
HRS cohort only in Figures 17 and 18.  In Figure 17 we see mean family earnings for the 
three marital transition groups.  All decline over time as some of the cohort retires.  New 
widows lost more than the others.  From this chart we cannot say how much was lost 
husband’s income and how much was due to changes in the woman’s earnings.  Figure 
18 provides earnings information for women only.  There we see that all women had 
earnings declines, with new widows consistently at lower earnings levels.  By subtracting 
women’s earnings from family earnings, we find that at baseline the men in marriages 
  16that would remain intact earned about $36,000 compared with only $18,000 for men who 
would leave a widow by 1998.  Earnings response was therefore not a significant factor 




  The Health and Retirement Study (which now subsumes the AHEAD study) is a 
compelling source for studying the economic circumstances of widows.  For the older 
population, the biennial cross-section data are a reasonable substitute for CPS for 
measuring poverty and its relationship to basic demographic variables.  Because the HRS 
cross-sections have so much more information on wealth, health, and retrospective 
marital histories, they can be used to study more complex associations.   Even more 
importantly, the longitudinal perspective permits the study of the dynamics of poverty 
and the changes in economic status that accompany a husband’s death and the years that 
follow it. 
  In this paper we found that duration of widowhood had a strong negative 
relationship with economic status at any age.  A substantial part of that relationship is due 
to effects associated with age at widowhood.  Women widowed in their 50s were more 
likely to have been poor before widowhood, and suffered greater loss of assets and 
pension income compared with women widowed after age 70.  A substantial part of 
pension accrual and retirement savings occurs in the years just preceding retirement, so 
early widowhood prevents future growth in resources, as well.   Social Security, which is 
so important in alleviating widow poverty for women widowed after 65, and for 
  17protecting dependent children and their widowed mothers, is of relatively little help for 
women widowed in their 50s.  Few receive benefits for dependent children, and they 
must wait several years for retirement benefits. 
  Faced with the loss of resources in widowhood, women have only a few options 
available to respond by improving their economic status.  Remarriage is difficult because 
of the demographic imbalances caused by shorter male life expectancy. It is too rare in 
the HRS to study its benefits.  Co-residing with children or siblings is another way to be 
part of a household with more resources.  We found that widowhood did increase the 
income of other family members in the widow’s household as one would expect.  Earning 
income through work is the other main way women can improve their status.  That 
becomes increasingly difficult with age.  Even for women in the HRS cohort, however, 
there was little evidence that the loss of a husband led to higher earnings by the woman. 
  Social Security policy needs to remain attentive to the special situation of 
widows.  Within the current age rules, the main concern will be with the fairness of the 
distribution of widow (and spouse) benefits in which a low-earning widow may have 
lower benefits than a married woman who never worked.  We would suggest that 
additional attention be paid to the welfare of women widowed after their children have 
grown but before they have completed their retirement preparations.  Not only are 
widows at that age more vulnerable, they are more likely to be in poverty many years 
later. 
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         HRS and AHEAD     Current PopulationSurvey    
   Age  Year  Married  Div/Sep  Widowed Never Mar All     Married  Div/Sep  Widowed Never Mar All    
                                            
   51-61  1992  4.9  21.6  21.5  21.1  10.3     6.1  21.9  25.3  19.9  11.2    
   53-63  1994  4.8  23.6  26.5  26.5  11.6     6.4  21.7  24.8  22.0  11.7    
   57-67  1998  4.2  20.2  19.7  26.9  10.4     6.4  23.1  21.6  25.5  12.2    
                                            
   70+  1993  6.1  29.3  20.1  24.2  15.8     7.6  27.6  22.0  26.3  17.5    
   72+  1995  4.4  26.9  18.3  21.9  14.2     7.3  29.1  20.3  29.7  17.0    
   75+  1998  2.7  27.2  17.8  31.3  14.4     6.1  25.0  18.3  20.2  15.0    
                                            
   51-64  1998  4.5  16.5  19.6  22.3  9.4     5.5  21.5  21.4  22.8  11.0    
   65-79  1998  2.8  26.0  14.5  26.6  10.3     5.5  23.9  17.2  21.5  12.2    
   80+  1998  4.0  33.3  20.3  41.1  19.0     7.5  21.0  19.1  16.2  16.6    
   All  1998  3.9  19.7  17.3  26.2  10.9     5.6  22.1  18.6  21.4  12.2    
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  4Table 2. 
Transition Rates into Poverty by Marital Status at Beginning and End of Period: HRS and AHEAD Compared with RHS 
 
 















             
RHS 1973-75  49  4  85  37  50  11 
HRS 1992-94  39  3  82  30  59  14 
HRS 1994-98  30  3  43  15  44  7 
AHD 1993-95  31  2  58  10  54  9 
AHD 1995-98  44  2  58  12  63  10 
             
Sources:  Authors’ calculations from HRS 1992, 1994, 1998, and AHEAD 1992, 1995; RHS data from Hurd 
and Wise (1989, Table 6.3). 
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Figure 12. 
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Figure 14. 
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Changes in Income of Other Family Members by Marital Status from 1993 to 1998: AHEAD Women 
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